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Abstract
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible
resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equi-
libria. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by
the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We
numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both
countries are better off if the importing country is a leader, but that
the follower becomes worse off if the exporting country is a leader.
Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing coun-
try’s leadership and lowest under the exporting country’s leadership.
Keywords: dynamic game, feedback Nash equilibrium, feedback Stack-
elberg equilibrium.
JEL Classification: C73, L72.
1
1 Introduction
The world markets for gas and oils consist mainly of a small number of large
sellers and buyers. For instance, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
reports that the major energy exporters concentrate on the Middle East
and Russia whereas the United States, Japan and China have a substantial
share in the imports.1 These data suggest that bilateral monopoly roughly
prevails in the oil market in which both parties exercise market power. What
are the implications of market power for welfare of importing and exporting
countries, and the world?
There is a large literature that attempts to answer this question by using
a dynamic game. Newbery (1976) and Kemp and Long (1980) are among the
earliest contributions, showing that the optimal tariff is time inconsistent in
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.2 In order to overcome this difficulty,
Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992) consider a feedback (Markovian) model in
which importing countries play a dynamic game with perfectly competitive
exporters. Karp and Newbery (1991) compare two situations, in one of which
the importing countries are the first movers in each period while in the other
of which the competitive exporters choose their outputs before the import-
ing countries set their tariff rates. They numerically demonstrate that being
the first-mover can be disadvantageous. Focusing on the Nash equilibrium,
Karp and Newbery (1992) make a welfare comparison between free trade
and the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. While Karp and Newbery (1991,
1992) assume price-taking suppliers, Wirl (1994) computes a feedback Nash
equilibrium when both the importing and exporting countries have market
power. His novel result is that resource extraction is more conservative than
the globally efficient level, but that the equilibrium converges to the effi-
cient steady state.3 His model has been extended in several ways. Chou
1The latest data are available at http://www.eia.gov/.
2The time consistency issue is further studied by Karp (1984) who assumes that produc-
tion cost depends on the resource stock. Newbery (1981) does not deal with the optimal
tariff issues, but points another type of time inconsistency when a cartel is the open-loop
Stackelberg leader and a fringe of competitive producers acts as the followers.
3In the steady state, a positive resource stock remains in the ground even though extrac-
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and Long (2009), maintaining the assumption of Nash behavior, extend the
model to accommodate many importers and compare welfare in free trade
and the Nash equilibrium. Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and Escriche (2001)
turn attention to Stackelberg games. Both papers show that outcome of the
Nash equilibrium is identical to that of the Stackelberg equilibrium where
the exporting country leads.4
This paper is also in line with this literature, but our model and purpose
are quite different. First, we consider the case where the seller chooses quan-
tity whereas all of the above papers assume price-setting behavior. Given
the fact that recent price fluctuations of oil are caused by quantity control
by the resource-rich countries, our quantity-setting formulation seems more
plausible. Second, we compare welfare of each country and the world in the
Nash equilibrium and the two Stackelberg equilibria where the leadership
role is taken by the importer and the exporter, respectively. Third and most
importantly, we derive feedback Stackelberg equilibria which are conceptu-
ally different from Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and Escriche (2001). Roughly
speaking, they assume that the leader moves first in each period, but does not
necessarily try to improve upon its Nash equilibrium payoff stream. Such a
solution may be called a stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium. In contrast, since
we suppose that the leader determines a Markovian rule over the entire hori-
zon of the game, a solution concept that may be called a global Stackelberg
equilibrium.5 With these differences, we establish that (i) as compared to the
Nash equilibrium, both the exporting country and (strategically-behaving)
importing country are better off if the importing country leads, (ii) the im-
porting country becomes worse off if the exporting country leads, and (iii)
the world welfare is highest under the importing country’s leadership and
lowest under the exporting country’s leadership. Therefore, the important
tion is costless. This is because a Pigouvian tax that corrects stock-pollution externalities
chokes off the demand.
4While Wirl (1994) assumes costless extraction, Tahvonen postulates a quadratic ex-
traction cost function, and the other two papers assume a stock-dependent cost.
5This concept is discussed in Dockner et al. (2000), Basar and Olsder (1995), Mehlmann
(1988), and Long (2010).
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implication derived from our findings is that the importing country should
have a leadership over the exporting country.
These findings sharply contrast to the results of Tahvonen (1996) and
Rubio and Escriche (2001) that the exporting country’s welfare under its
leadership is the same as in the Nash equilibrium. They are also in sharp
contrast to the price-setting model of Fujiwara and Long (2011) where the
world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium.6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section 3
derives the feedback Nash equilibrium. Sections 4 characterizes the feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the importing country is the leader. Section
5, on the other hand, turns to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in which
the exporting country leads. Section 6 presents numerical results. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the model. There are three countries labeled Home,
Foreign, and ROW (the rest of the world). A Foreign monopolistic firm
produces and exports a good denoted by y to Home and ROW exclusively.7
In producing the good, the Foreign firm extracts an exhaustible resource.
Due to geological factors, it is commonly observed that marginal extrac-
tion cost increases as the remaining stock of resource decreases.8 This feature
has been taken into account by various authors. Our formulation of extrac-
tion cost is closest to that of Karp (1984).
Let X be the initial size of the deposit and X(t) be the stock of resource
6Fujiwara and Long (2011) assume that the exporting country chooses prices, as in the
cited papers.
7The good is not consumed in Foreign, and the market of Home and ROW is assumed
to be integrated and hence the Foreign firm does not supply to each country separately.
8In a recent exposition of the state of the oil market, Smith (2009, p. 147) points out
that most of the oil in any given deposit will never be produced, and therefore does not
count as proved reserves, because it would be too costly to effect complete recovery.” This
indicates that the “exhaustion” of a deposit should be interpreted as an “abandonment”
of the deposit after the profitable part has been exploited.
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that remains at time t, and define S(t) = X − X(t) ≥ 0. Then, marginal
extraction cost is increasing in S. Letting y(t) denote the extraction at time
t, the cost of extracting y(t) is assumed to be C = [cA + cS(t)]y(t), where
cA ≥ 0 and c > 0. In what follows, we set cA = 0 for simplicity. Our results
are not qualitatively affected even if cA is positive.
Denote by a the maximum price that consumers would be willing to pay
for the first unit of resource consumed at any t, which is called the choke price.
It is clear if marginal cost of extraction, cS(t), is higher than the choke price,
it is socially inefficient to extract the resource. Therefore, extraction must
stop as soon as S(t) reaches the critical level S = a/c (if X is sufficiently large
so that S can reach S before exhaustion). In what follows, we assume that X
is large enough so that the resource stock is abandoned before exhaustion.9
The utility function of the two importing countries is specified by10
uH = aqH1 −
(
qH1
)2
2b
+ qH2 (1)
uROW = aqROW1 −
(
qROW1
)2
2(1− b) + q
ROW
2 , a > 0,
where ui, i = H,ROW is utility of Home and ROW, and qi1 and q
i
2 are
consumption of the imported good and numeraire good, respectively. The
parameter b ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of the Home demand in the world
demand if there is no tariff. Assuming that the Home government imposes
a specific tariff on the import of Good 1 and that ROW observes laissez-
faire, utility maximization under the budget constraint yields the demand
functions
qH1 = b(a− p− τ), qROW1 = (1− b)(a− p), (2)
where p is the world price of Good 1 and τ is the tariff imposed by Home. Let-
ting y be the total supply of the Foreign firm, the market-clearing condition
is
b(a− p− τ) + (1− b)(a− p) = a− p− bτ = y,
9Karp (1984) also focuses on this case.
10In what follows, the time argument t is suppressed unless any confusion arises.
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from which the inverse demand function is defined by p = a−y− bτ . Substi-
tuting this into (2) and (1), and considering that Home’s welfare W consists
of consumer surplus and tariff revenue, we obtain
W = aqH1 −
(
qH1
)2
2b
− (p+ τ)qH1 + τqH1
=
b[y + (1 + b)τ ][y − (1− b)τ ]
2
=
b [y2 + 2bτy − (1− b2) τ 2]
2
. (3)
On the other hand, the Foreign firm’s profit pi is
pi = (a− bτ − cS − y)y. (4)
Home and Foreign strategically choose a time profile of τ and y by taking
into account the resource dynamics in an infinite time horizon. Thus, the
present model takes the form of the following dynamic game:
max
τ
∫ ∞
0
e−rtWdt
max
y
∫ ∞
0
e−rtpidt
s.t. S˙ = y, S(0)S0 > 0, lim
t→∞ ≤
a
c
,
where r > 0 is a common rate of discount. The subsequent sections find the
Nash and Stackelberg solutions under linear feedback (Markovian) strategies.
3 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
This section considers a feedback Nash equilibrium of the above game. For
this purpose, let us define each player’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation. By the assumption of simultaneous moves, Home does not ob-
serve the firm’s output y(t) when it makes the tariff decision τ(t), and the
Foreign firm makes its output decision without knowing the tariff rate τ(t).
Assume the Home government thinks that the Foreign firm has the output
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strategy y = φ(S) while the Foreign firms thinks that the Home country has
the tariff strategy τ = ψ(S). Then, the two HJB equations are
rV (S) = max
τ
{
b {[φ(S)]2 + 2bτφ(S)− (1− b2)τ 2}
2
+ VS(S)φ(S)
}
rV ∗(S) = max
y
{[a− bψ(S)− cS − y] y + V ∗S (S)y} , (5)
where V (S) and V ∗(S) are the value function of Home and Foreign. The first-
order conditions for maximizing the right-hand side of the HJB equations
give
bφ(S)− (1− b2)τ = 0
a− bψ(S)− cS − 2y + V ∗S (S) = 0.
In equilibrium, what each player thinks about the other’s strategy is correct
and thus we have
τ = ψ(S) =
b [V ∗S (S)− cS + a]
2− b2 (6)
y = φ(S) =
(1− b2) [V ∗S (S)− cS + a]
2− b2 . (7)
Substituting these into the Foreign HJB equation, we obtain
rV ∗(S) = [φ(S)]2 =
[
(1− b2)[V ∗(S)− cS + a]
2− b2
]2
.
Solving the above system determining φ(S) and ψ(S) yields
φ(S) =
(1− b2) (a− cS + V ∗S )
2− b2 .
Let us guess that the value function is quadratic in S because of our
restriction of linear strategies. Then, the HJB equation of Foreign becomes
r
(
A∗
2
S2 +B∗S + C∗
)
=
{
(1− b2)[(A∗ − c)S +B∗ + a]
(2− b2)
}2
.
Equating the coefficients of the terms S2, S, and the constant terms on both
sides of the equation, we get
A∗ =
4c(1− b2)2 + r(2− b2)2 − (2− b2)√∆
4(1− b2)2 (8)
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B∗ =
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]
a
r(2− b2) +√∆ (9)
C∗ = r
[
2(1− b2)a
r(2− b2) +√∆
]2
(10)
∆ ≡ 8cr(1− b2)2 + r2(2− b2)2 > 0.
In a similar way, we can obtain the coefficients of Home’s value function
V (S) = AS2/2 +BS + C as follows.
A =
b
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]2
8(1− b2)2
(
−rb2 +√∆
) (11)
B =
rb
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]
a(
−rb2 +√∆
) [
r(2− b2) +√∆
] (12)
C =
b
−rb2 +√∆
[
2r(1− b2)a
r(2− b2) +√∆
]2
. (13)
Accordingly, in the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (hereafter, MPNE), the
strategy of each player takes a form of
τ = ψ(S) = αNS + βN
=
b
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]
4(1− b2)2 S −
b
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]
a
4c(1− b2)2 (14)
y = φ(S) = α∗NS + β
∗
N
=
r(2− b2)−√∆
4(1− b2) S −
[
r(2− b2)−√∆
]
a
4c(1− b2) . (15)
Using these results, we can arrive at:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium in linear
strategies where both the equilibrium tariff and output converge to zero.
Proof. The resource dynamics in linear strategies is
S˙ = y = α∗NS + β
∗
N = α
∗
N
(
S +
β∗N
α∗N
)
= α∗N
(
S − a
c
)
.
Thus, in the steady state such that S = a/c, we have y = 0 and τ = 0 by
noting that τ = by/(1− b2). ||
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4 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Im-
porter’s Leadership
This and the next sections turn to two Stackelberg equilibria. This sec-
tion considers the case where Home is a leader. In order to solve the game
backward, we begin by examining Foreign’s behavior. The Foreign firm an-
ticipates that the leader chooses a strategy τ(S) = αS+β. Then, the Foreign
firm’s HJB equation is
rV ∗(S) = max
y
{[a− b(αS + β)− cS − y + V ∗S (S)] y} .
Guessing V ∗(S) = A∗S2/2 + B∗S + C∗, the first-order condition for maxi-
mizing the right-hand side gives the follower’s reaction function:
y(S) =
(A∗ − bα− c)S +B∗ + a− bβ
2
. (16)
Substituting this into the HJB equation, we have
rV ∗(S) = [y(S)]2.
Applying this equation to the above specification of the value function, the
three coefficients will be
A∗ = bα + c+ r −
√
Γ (17)
B∗ =
(
r −√Γ
)
(a− bβ)
r +
√
Γ
(18)
C∗ =
1
r

(
r −√Γ
)
(a− bβ)
2(bα + c)
2 (19)
Γ ≡ r(2bα + 2c+ r) > 0.
Substituting these into (16), the Foreign firm’s strategy is
y(S) = α∗S + β∗ =
r −√Γ
2
S −
(
r −√Γ
)
(a− bβ)
2(bα + c)
. (20)
Let us turn to the solving the leader’s problem, which involves a few auxiliary
steps. First, considering that the resource dynamics is expressed by S˙ =
9
α∗S + β∗, the solution is
S(t) = eα
∗t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
− β
∗
α∗
. (21)
Second, under the linear strategies τ = αS + β and y = α∗S + β∗, the Home
welfare flow at t with the resource stock S is
2W
b
= (α∗S + β∗)2 + 2b(αS + β)(α∗S + β∗)−
(
1− b2
)
(αS + β)
=
[
α∗2 + 2bαα∗ −
(
1− b2
)
α2
]
S2 + 2
[
α∗β∗ + b(αβ∗ + α∗β)−
(
1− b2
)
αβ
]
S
+β∗2 + 2bββ∗ −
(
1− b2
)
β2
=
−2(1− b2)α2 + r(3bα + c+ r)− (2bα + r)√Γ
2
e(r−
√
Γ)t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)2
−
[
2(1− b2)α− b
(
r −√Γ
)
(αa+ βc)
]
bα + c
e
r−√Γ
2
t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
−
(
1− b2
)(αa+ βc
bα + c
)2
,
where the last equation uses (21).
Third, taking the integral of the discounted sum of welfare, we have∫ ∞
0
e−rt
2W
b
=
−2(1− b2)α2 + r(3bα + c+ r)− (2bα + r)√Γ
2
√
Γ
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)2
−2
[
2(1− b2)α− b
(
r −√Γ
)
(αa+ βc)
]
(
r +
√
Γ
)
(bα + c)
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
−1− b
2
r
(
αa+ βc
bα + c
)2
, (22)
which is to be maximized by Home by controlling α and β. Since this is just
a static maximization problem, the optimal value of α and β is in principle
obtained with calculus only. However, one can see that the solutions of α
and β obtained through this method would depend on S0, which implies that
such solutions are time-inconsistent. In order to overcome this difficulty, we
impose a time consistency condition: the restriction that αa+βc = 0 so that
the second and the third terms in (22) vanish and the first-order condition
becomes independent of S0.
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Under this restriction, the Foreign output is, from (20),
y(S) = α∗S + β∗ =
r −√Γ
2
(
S − a
c
)
, (23)
and Foreign welfare is, from (22),
V ∗(S) =
1
r
[
r −√Γ
2
(
S − a
c
)]2
. (24)
With the time consistency condition, our maximization problem amounts
to
max
α
−2(1− b2)α2 + r(3bα + c+ r)− (2bα + r)√Γ
2
√
Γ
(
S0 − a
c
)2
.
The first-order condition for this maximization problem is
2b(2bα + 2c+ r)
√
r(2bα + 2c+ r) = −2
(
1− b2
)
α(3bα + 4c+ 2r) + rb(3bα + 5c+ 2r),
which is equivalent to
4r
1
2 b2θ
3
2
1− b2 = −3θ
2 + θ
(
3rb2
1− b2 + 4c+ 2r
)
+
[
rb2(4c+ r)
1− b2 + (2c+ r)
2
]
≡ −3θ2 + ηθ + µ,
by transforming the variables such that θ = 2bα+2c+r. In the present case,
we can prove a result that is parallel with Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the importing country is a leader. Then, there
exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where both
the equilibrium tariff and output converge to zero.
Proof. Under the time consistency condition, we have
τ(S) = αS + β = αS − αa
c
= α
(
S − a
c
)
.
Thus, the steady state in which S = a/c involves τ(a/c) = 0, and y(a/c) = 0
from (23). ||
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5 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Ex-
porter’s Leadership
Finally, this section deals with the case in which the Foreign firm is a leader.
Supposing that the leader’s strategy is y(S) = α∗S + β∗, Home’s HJB equa-
tion is
rV (S) = max
τ
{
b [(α∗S + β∗)2 + 2bτ(α∗S + β∗)− (1− b2)τ 2]
2
+ VS(S)(α
∗S + β∗)
}
The first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields
τ(S) =
b(α∗S + β∗)
1− b2 . (25)
Substituting this into the definition of the Foreign firm’s profit, we have
pi =
[
a− b
2(α∗S + β∗)
1− b2 − cS − α
∗S − β∗
]
(α∗S + β∗)
Noting that S depends on α∗ and β∗ in such a way that
S(t) = eα
∗t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
− β
∗
α∗
,
the above profit is rewritten further:(
1− b2
)
pi = −α∗
[
α∗ +
(
1− b2
)
c
]
S2 +
[
−2α∗β∗ +
(
1− b2
)
(α∗a− β∗c)
]
S
−β∗
[
β∗ −
(
1− b2
)
a
]
= −α∗
[
α∗ +
(
1− b2
)
c
]
e2α
∗t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)2
+
(
1− b2
)
(α∗a+ β∗c)eα
∗t
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
Taking the integral from 0 to ∞, the Foreign firm’s objective function be-
comes∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
1− b2
)
pidt =
−α∗[α∗ + (1− b2)c]
r − 2α∗
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)2
+
(1− b2)(α∗a+ β∗c)
r − α∗
(
S0 +
β∗
α∗
)
,
which is maximized by Foreign that chooses α∗ and β∗.
In principle, we can find the equilibrium strategy of the leader by seeking
α∗ and β∗ which maximize this function. However, such solutions can be
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time-inconsistent for the same reason as in the preceding section. Therefore,
we must impose once again the time consistency condition: α∗a + β∗c = 0.
Under it, the welfare of the leader becomes
−α∗[α∗ + (1− b2)c]
(r − 2α∗)(1− b2)
(
S0 − a
c
)
, (26)
which is to be maximized with respect to α∗. The associated first-order
condition is
2α∗ − 2rα∗ − r(1− b2)c
(r − 2α∗)2 = 0,
which yields
α∗ =
r −√Φ
2
< 0 (27)
Φ ≡ 2rc
(
1− b2
)
+ r2 > 0.
Moreover, using (27), we can derive the coefficients of the follower’s value
function V (S) = AS2/2 +BS + C as follows.
A =
bα∗2
(1− b2)(r − 2α∗)
B =
bα∗β∗
(1− b2)(r − 2α∗)
C∗ =
bβ∗2
2(1− b2)(r − 2α∗) . (28)
Based on these results, we can prove a result that is parallel with Propositions
1 and 2:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the exporting country is a leader. Then, there
exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where both
the equilibrium tariff and output converge to zero.
Proof. Under the time consistency condition, we have
y(S) = α∗S + β∗ = α
(
S − a
c
)
, τ(S) =
by(S)
1− b2 .
Hence, in the steady state such that S = a/c, both y(S) and τ(S) converges
to zero. ||
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6 Welfare Implications
Having derived three equilibria, this section examines welfare implications
of these equilibria. In the analysis, we must resort to numerical examples
since the equilibrium condition in each equilibrium involves a complicated
polynomial. In what follows, we assume S0 = 0, r = 0.1, c = 1 and b
2 = 0.5
(b ≈ 0.71).11
(Tables 1 and 2 around here)
Tables 1 and 2 report a comparison among the equilibrium strategies.
When Home (the importing country) is a leader, it chooses a lower tariff
than in the Nash equilibrium. This is because the Home government is mo-
tivated to capture the Foreign rent by encouraging production. In response
to this strategy of Home, Foreign (the exporting country) naturally increases
production. If, on the other hand, Foreign is a leader, it chooses a lower
output to seek a high price and large rent. Observing this strategy choice
of Foreign, Home retaliates by lowering a tariff for shifting the Foreign rent.
These findings are well consistent with the outcomes in static games.12
(Figures 1 and 2 around here)
(Table 3 around here)
Table 3 summarizes the welfare comparisons among equilibria. Not sur-
prisingly, the both countries improve their welfare as compared to the Nash
equilibrium, which comes from the definition of the Stackelberg equilibria.
In contrast, the effect on the followers’ welfare is different between the two
Stackelberg equilbiria. If Home leads, welfare of Foreign as well as Home im-
proves, i.e., Home’s leadership entails a Pareto improvement from the Nash
equilibrium. However, if Foreign leads, Home (the follower) becomes worse
11The detailed derivations of the tables in this paper are available from the authors
upon request.
12Figures 1 and 2 depict the two Stackelberg equilibria in a static setting. In the figures,
points N,H and F refer to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium with Home’s
leadership and the Stackelberg equilibrium with Foreign’s leadership, respectively.
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off than in the Nash equilibrium. These welfare changes are also confirmed
in Figures 1 and 2 in which static games are assumed.
The third column in Table 3 shows the welfare levels of ROW. It reveals
that the presence of leaderships has a detrimental effect on ROW and that
its welfare is lowest when Foreign is a leader. The last column provides
the welfare of the world that is defined by the sum of the three countries’
welfare. We can easily see that the world welfare is highest when Home
is a leader. This is because, as mentioned just above, this case yields a
Pareto improvement from the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when
Foreign is a leader, the world welfare is lowest. The reason is that Foreign
chooses a much smaller output than in the Nash case, which reduces consumer
surplus of the two importing countries. As a result, reduced welfare of Home
and ROW dominates enhanced welfare of Foreign, which leads to the lowest
welfare of the world.
(Figure 3 around here)
Finally, we draw diagrams that depict a dynamic path of welfare of Home
and Foreign. Figure 3 consists of three graphs. The top graph gives a path
of Home welfare, the middle one gives a path of Foreign welfare, and the
bottom one gives a path of the world welfare. The top graph tells that Home
welfare is highest when it is a leader until a certain time, but after that time
it is the highest when Foreign is a leader. The same observation is no longer
true of the Foreign welfare: it is always highest when it has a leadership. As
to the world welfare, the ranking reversal similar to Home welfare is found.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have explored feedback Stackelberg equilibria in a two-(strategic) country
dynamic game model of an exhaustible resource. Unlike the existing litera-
ture that employs a stagewise Stackelberg solution, we have paid attention
to the hierarchical Stackelberg equilibria. Despite the above contributions,
we have left much unexplored. In particular, we have restricted attention
15
to linear strategies. However, Shimomura and Xie (2008) have provided an
example of renewable resource exploitation in which there exist nonlinear
feedback strategies that are superior to linear strategies.13 Tackling this
problem in the context of exhaustible resource markets is part of our future
research agenda.
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α α∗
Nash −0.227475584 −0.160849528
Stackelberg (Home is leader) −0.200588442 −0.163091829
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) −0.16381011 −0.11583124
Table 1: α and α∗ under S0 = 0, r = 0.1, c = 1 and b2 = 0.5
β β∗
Nash 0.227475584a 0.160849528a
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.200588442a 0.163091829a
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.16381011a 0.11583124a
Table 2: β and β∗ under S0 = 0, r = 0.1, c = 1 and b2 = 0.5
Home Foreign ROW Total
Nash 0.043383237a2 0.258725708a2 0.015155801a2 0.317264746a2
Home leader 0.043757137a2 0.265989447a2 0.013616879a2 0.323363463a2
Foreign leader 0.028604876a2 0.268337521a2 0.007859424a2 0.304801821a2
Table 3: Payoffs under S0 = 0, r = 0.1, c = 1 and b
2 = 0.5
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Foreign reaction curve
N
H
Home welfare W ↑
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O
Figure 1: Static Stackelberg equilibrium: Home is a leader
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Figure 2: Static Stackelberg equilibrium: Foreign is a leader
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Figure 3: Time paths of welfare
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